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This paper takes a somewhat negative approach to the 
goal of building collaboration to address transnational 
maritime security issues in the Indo-Pacific. It does 
not make the case that seeking improvements in 
cooperation is unreasonable, unworkable or simply not 
worthwhile1 – only that there exist sound reasons why 
strict limits to maritime security cooperation pertain in 
many circumstances. Some of those reasons may be 
due to temporary contexts, such as short-term political 
factors. Others may relate to problems inherent in the 
particular issue in question, and yet others may be deeply 
structural and, indeed, intractable. My argument therefore 
is structured in the following way. First, it addresses the 
intractable, underlying problems that make progress in 
maritime security cooperation so difficult. Second, it briefly 
addresses certain transnational maritime security issues, 
explaining why cooperation to deal with some threats is 
much easier than for others. 
Structural limits
The following sections deal in detail with what I term 
structural constraints to better maritime security 
collaboration in the Indo-Pacific area. These structural 
limitations involve three interrelated factors: geography, 
coastal state concerns with control over waters under 
their jurisdiction, and political and strategic contexts. The 
problems are ‘structural’ in that they either are inherent 
and insurmountable, or of an intractable nature, making 
resolution unlikely, if not necessarily inconceivable. Indeed, 
these types of framing difficulties for the regional maritime 
security environment have been described in terms of the 
‘wicked problem’ descriptor.2 
Geography
Physical geography can create potential political 
headaches in different parts of the Indo-Pacific, 
particularly once political and legal frameworks are laid 
atop physical features. However, physical characteristics 
can of themselves create difficulties. This is generally the 
case with East Asia, but particularly so with respect to 
archipelagic Southeast Asia. In East Asia, the island chains 
that lie adjacent to the Asian mainland and semi-enclose 
the string of connected seas from the Sea of Okhotsk in 
the northeast, through to the Andaman Sea on the south-
western, Indian Ocean, side of peninsular Southeast Asia, 
create inherent complications for assuring maritime safety 
and security. The fact that these semi-enclosed seas are 
shared by numerous adjacent or nearby states, are used 
by many others, and involve valuable marine resources, 
actual or assumed, greatly complicates the practice of 
maritime security. A similar problem afflicts the Persian  
Gulf, for example, where several states must share one 
enclosed sea space with a single narrow entry/exit point: 
the straits of Hormuz. 
The geographical context of archipelagic Southeast 
Asia, consisting as it does of many thousands of islands, 
necessarily makes attempts at securing good order at 
sea a daunting task for authorities at the best of times. 
The sheer extent of the eastern archipelago and the large 
number of its islands makes it the most complex maritime 
geography on the planet, and thus extremely difficult to 
surveil and police. For the same reasons, the area is a 
natural haven for criminals, terrorists, and other sea users 
who behave contrary to the interests of good order at sea. 
It would be incorrect to state that the area is ungoverned, 
and certainly it would be unsound to suggest that the 
waters of the eastern archipelago are ungovernable; yet it 
must be recognized that good order is devilishly difficult to 
impose within this overarching constraint of such complex 
maritime geography.
Once political factors are added to physical geography, 
the prospects for maritime security collaboration often are 
made considerably worse. The competitive, sometimes 
acquisitive, nature of state behaviour, which invariably 
stresses the pursuit of the ‘national interest,’ conditions 
the international politics of the seas and oceans just as 
it does for terrestrial matters, and increasingly also for 
the environments of international airspace, outer space 
and cyberspace. One of the most politically daunting 
challenges to manage if states are to better cooperate at 
sea is that of disputed claims to maritime territory, from 
significant islands to tiny, often physically trivial, rocks and 
atolls, many of which may remain under water at high tide. 
The Indo-Pacific is replete with maritime territorial disputes, 
from the Persian Gulf to the mid-Indian Ocean Chagos 
archipelago, to the Southwest Pacific. 
However, in respect to maritime territorial disputes it is East 
Asia which again dominates matters in the Indo-Pacific. 
1 The author, in fact, has long been involved with organizing and 
delivering regional maritime security cooperation and capacity-building 
programmes for different agencies of the Australian government, and 
understands both the potential and actual value of such collaborative 
activities. 
2 See Sam Bateman, “Solving the ‘Wicked Problems’ of Maritime 
Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia Vol. 33, No. 1 (2011), pp. 1-28.
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The overlay of politics upon physical geography has 
created many of the world’s most intractable island 
disputes, the foremost of which is the mainland Chinese 
claim to the self-governing island of Taiwan. Taiwan 
is unique among island disputes in that it involves a 
heavily populated, successful and prosperous de facto 
independent state. Most other territorial disputes in 
maritime East Asia instead involve either very small islands 
or rocky features that remain unoccupied, or similar 
features that are minimally garrisoned by the security 
forces of one of the claimant states. The most noteworthy 
of these disputes include the southern Kuriles/Northern 
Territories (Russia-Japan); Tokdo/Takeshima (South Korea-
Japan); the Senkakus/Diaoyutai (Japan-Taiwan-China); 
the Pratas Islands (Taiwan-China); the Paracels (China-
Vietnam-Taiwan); Scarborough Shoal (China-Philippines-
Taiwan); and the Spratly archipelago (China-Vietnam-
Taiwan-Philippines-Malaysia-Brunei). In each case the 
dominant or controlling claimant has been listed first. The 
identification of a dominant claimant (i.e. the claimant with 
physical control of relevant features) has been rather more 
contestable in the case of the infamous Spratly disputes  
in the South China Sea, but Beijing’s assertions, expansion, 
including island construction, and militarisation throughout 
the archipelago in recent years make it clearer than ever 
that China seeks a form of regional control. Indeed,  
China’s actions throughout East Asian seas have made it 
both more important and, at the same time, often more 
difficult, to engage Beijing in many aspects of maritime 
security collaboration. 
Regional geography in East Asia also greatly complicates 
coastal state jurisdiction over adjacent sea areas. These 
are rights under international law generated by sovereignty 
over land features. This involves overlaying the legal 
framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (Law of the Sea Convention or UNCLOS) upon 
the political and physical aspects of the region’s maritime 
geography. Even leaving aside the further complicating 
impact of territorial disputes upon maritime jurisdiction, the 
basic political geography of East Asia has dealt regional 
states a difficult hand to play in claiming jurisdiction. The 
‘narrow seas’ character of the region’s semi-enclosed seas 
means that its coastal states will more often than not have 
to compromise with their neighbours in order to determine 
jurisdiction over adjacent waters. For example, at no point 
does the East China Sea exceed 400 nautical miles in 
breadth. Yet, as China and Japan both claim the maximum 
allowable exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical 
miles as measured from their territorial sea baselines, their 
claims unavoidably overlap. Such jurisdictional disputes are 
rendered even more delicate when territorial disputes are 
factored into maritime jurisdictional claims. In this way, East 
China Sea claims are impacted by the effect that Taiwan, 
with its highly emotive disputed status, and the disputed 
Senkaku Islands, also impose upon jurisdictional claims. 
Similarly complicated, if perhaps not so inherently 
dangerous, maritime jurisdictional disputes exist elsewhere 
in East Asia, placing further constraints upon prospects for 
improved maritime security collaboration. The potential for 
already fraught maritime jurisdictional claims in the South 
China Sea to be negatively affected by more-expansive 
claims derived from disputed territories is a spectre that 
haunts the prospects for successful maritime delimitation 
in the area. Currently, the extent of maritime jurisdictional 
claims generated by occupied or claimed territorial features 
under dispute remains uncertain and contested, both with 
respect to interpretations of international law and individual 
claimant state positions. Collaboration at sea is made 
inherently difficult if jurisdiction is disputed or uncertain, or if 
boundaries remain undelimited. 
Coastal state control
In addition to the problem of disputed sovereignty over 
maritime territory, many coastal states in the Indo-Pacific 
region continue to assert rights over adjacent waters that 
can be deemed to significantly exceed the potential rights 
to jurisdiction granted by the Law of the Sea Convention.3 
This phenomenon has commonly been termed one of 
‘creeping’ coastal state jurisdiction, and is particularly 
common among geopolitically dissatisfied states such 
as China, and many developing states. The problem of 
excessive claims to maritime jurisdiction is a global one, but 
the complex maritime geography of East Asia, in particular, 
as outlined above, makes the problem more acute in East 
Asian waters. The problem to some extent reflects the 
preoccupation of some developing states with a post-
colonial maximalist view of sovereignty assertion. Such 
assertions at sea may reflect a lack of confidence in their 
capacity to actually protect existing maritime rights. This 
may be a particular concern for archipelagic states such 
as Indonesia and the Philippines, and fellow straits state 
Malaysia. Concerns, probably unfounded, over sovereignty 
erosion, is a leading reason why neither Indonesia nor 
Malaysia have become parties to the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Nevertheless, such 
states can understandably feel particularly vulnerable to 
a range of threats due to the high volume of maritime 
traffic plying waters under their sovereignty and employing 
passage rights such as transit passage in straits used for 
international navigation,4 archipelagic sea lanes passage  
in archipelagic waters,5 or innocent passage in the  
territorial sea.6 
3 For the standard, albeit American, view on the extent of this problem, 
see J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, 
3rd ed. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012).
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (hereafter 
“UNCLOS”), arts. 37-44.
5 Ibid., arts. 53-54.
6 Ibid., arts. 17-26.
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They also may simply be attempting to push for rights long 
hoped for but unmet during UNCLOS negotiations. There 
may be a view among some states that, if they continue to 
assert such coveted rights and are unchallenged by other 
states, over time such rights may become accepted state 
practice and part of customary international law. Yet other 
states may simply be chancing their luck to see what they 
can get away with. 
It is possible that, over time, some states may be less 
inclined to make such assertions as their maritime 
capabilities grow, although the opposite trend has 
been apparent in China’s case. Further, the attitudes 
of some states with respect to sovereignty assertion is 
particularly heavily ingrained. Indonesia is a clear case 
in point. It is not at all certain whether any amount of 
local capacity improvement or confidence-building could 
change attitudes that are intimately linked to Indonesia’s 
archipelagic conception of national unity.7 
 It seems clear that China also seems to be pursuing 
a maximalist agenda at sea with its territorial and 
jurisdictional claims, and its ambition to be able to exert 
control over adjacent seas within, at a minimum, the so-
called first island chain.8 In China’s case, while Beijing 
may well believe in the righteousness of its claims, its 
rather more ambitious quest for regional control reflects its 
broader strategic and geopolitical goals for East Asia. 
The law of the sea, as with international law in general, is a 
slowly evolving beast. Since the Law of the Sea Convention 
was agreed in 1982, numerous post-UNCLOS international 
legal instruments have been negotiated, such as the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995, and the development 
of new environmental, safety and security regulations for 
shipping under the auspices of the International Maritime 
Organization. Many of these instruments further develop or 
modify aspects of the Law of the Sea Convention, including 
slowly regulating certain activities on the high seas.9 The 
basic principles of maritime jurisdiction based on specific 
UNCLOS zones, however, remain essentially unchanged. 
The Law of the Sea Convention took literally decades to 
negotiate, involving three international conferences and 
inevitable compromises between Third World coastal 
states, which desired ever-greater rights, and maritime 
powers and user states, which preferred to maintain many 
traditional freedoms. The resulting compromise established 
a delicate balance. That balance, and thus the Convention 
itself, is potentially placed at risk by the raft of excessive 
claims now being exerted in Asia.
The disputes that increasingly occur between coastal 
states claiming greater control over adjacent waters, and 
maritime powers seeking to sustain hard-won freedoms, 
are often referred to as a problem of ‘interpretation’ of 
the Law of the Sea Convention generated by its alleged 
ambiguity. The most contentious aspect in the Indo-Pacific 
relates to military operations in the exclusive economic 
zone.10 While there is intentional ambiguity in many 
parts of the Convention, a consequence of the difficult 
negotiation process, this issue can also be exaggerated. 
The problem of differing ‘interpretations’ in the context of 
military operations in the EEZ is simply a euphemism for 
a more fundamental difficulty. The problem, rather, is one 
that is better characterised as that of certain states wilfully 
choosing to misinterpret the Convention simply because 
they don’t like the implications of specific provisions.  
State parties to the Law of the Sea Convention, however, 
are unable to pick and choose which pieces of the 
Convention they wish to adhere to: it is a single, complete 
document, with interrelated provisions that can only be 
treated in their entirety. 
In fact, the UNCLOS provisions are relatively clear. There 
are no conceivable grounds by which a coastal state can 
interfere with the military operations of other states in its 
exclusive economic zone unless such activities undermine 
the very specific rights of UNCLOS Part V on the EEZ: that 
is, rights directly related to exploration and exploitation 
of marine resources, other economic uses of the zone, 
establishment or use of artificial islands and installations, 
marine scientific research, or protection and preservation 
of the marine environment.11 Otherwise, all the high seas 
freedoms of “navigation and overflight and the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally 
lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such 
as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft 
and submarine cables and pipelines …” apply also in the 
exclusive economic zone.12 Other high seas provisions 
(articles 88-115) also apply in the EEZ.13 Much is often 
made of the provision that, in exercising their EEZ rights, 
states “shall have due regard to the rights of the coastal 
State.”14 But those making that point commonly avoid 
noting that this duty is reciprocal: the UNCLOS also 
provides that “… the coastal State shall have due regard to 
the rights and duties of other States …” in the EEZ.15 
7 See Dino Patti Djalal, The Geopolitics of Indonesia’s Maritime 
Territorial Policy (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
1996).
8 On the island chain concept see Andrew S. Erickson and Joel 
Wuthnow, “Barriers, Springboards and Benchmarks: China 
Conceptualizes the Pacific ‘Island Chains,’” The China Quarterly Vol. 
225 (March 2016), pp. 1-22.
9 See, for example, Robin Warner, “The High Seas Regime: A Model 
of Self-regulation?” and “Developing New Regulatory Paradigms for 
the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity in Areas 
beyond National Jurisdiction,” both in Routledge Handbook of Maritime 
Regulation and Enforcement, ed. Robin Warner and Stuart Kaye 
(London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 16-26 and 394-408, respectively.
10 For extensive analysis and various viewpoints, see the two special 
editions of the journal Marine Policy, Vol. 28 (January 2004) and Vol. 29 
(March 2005).
11 UNCLOS art. 56(1).
12 Ibid., art. 58(1).
13 Ibid., art. 58(2).
14 Ibid., art. 58(3).
15 Ibid., art. 56(2).
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In both cases, those rights and duties relate directly and 
explicitly to the very narrow, mostly economic, purpose of 
the EEZ regime; that is, those limited types of activities for 
which the regime was designed, noted above.
Therefore, unless such coastal state economic or 
environmental rights are being hindered by a military 
operation, there are no grounds for the coastal state to 
interfere with the operation. Chinese efforts to prevent or 
interfere with American military operations in East Asian 
waters have been the most egregious examples of this 
type of interference in the Indo-Pacific region,16 but not the 
only ones. Indeed, there are many Indo-Pacific states that 
assert restrictions on the navigational freedoms of warships 
and other naval vessels, and not just in the exclusive 
economic zone.17 China has also been increasingly 
aggressive in its assertions in the airspace above its 
claimed EEZs. Beijing is on even weaker ground in the air 
than it is on the water, as has been made abundantly clear: 
“The airspace above the EEZ is not part of the EEZ and 
aircraft of all states have freedom of overflight and therefore 
the right to undertake military operations.”18 
Incidents that occur in and around disputed features, 
such as those in the South China Sea, may be particularly 
problematic, in that the sovereignty status of the features 
and the consequent status of adjacent waters are 
unresolved. Leaving aside debates on whether or not any 
of the disputed features are actually eligible under the 
UNCLOS to generate maritime zones of any consequence, 
Beijing’s maximalist agenda to be able to control, at a 
minimum, the entire disputed area encompassed within its 
infamous nine-dash line claim,19 if not potentially the entire 
sea space within the first island chain, creates an obvious 
challenge not just to the Law of the Sea, but extant 
international law and good order, generally. Cooperation 
even to combat common concerns with transnational 
maritime security threats under these circumstances 
obviously becomes far more problematic. This point  
leads directly into the next section, dealing with the 
underlying strategic factors that may limit the prospects for 
better collaboration. 
Political and strategic contexts
The negative impacts of China’s quest for control affect not 
just its rival claimant states, but all states with interests in 
the region or that depend upon good order at sea, directly 
or indirectly, for their continued security, prosperity and 
wellbeing. The fact that most states are trade-dependent, 
and thus need to interact with the large and growing 
economies of East Asia, means that most states have an 
interest in the maritime security situation in East Asia and 
throughout the Indo-Pacific, no matter where on the globe 
they are situated. Improving maritime security cooperation 
to protect that common interest under this weight of 
geopolitical threat to the current regional order, though, has 
become far more difficult. 
This problem becomes even more apparent when one 
considers that the principal instruments for securing order 
at sea, navies, and, to a lesser extent, coast guards, are 
the very forces that China is seeking to either exclude from 
the East Asian littoral region, or at least greatly limit their 
activities. This is particularly the case with respect to those 
maritime security forces that are part of the U.S. alliance 
system, or belong to other likeminded states that take 
the task of good order at sea seriously. China’s actions 
to restrict U.S. and other foreign military presence in East 
Asian seas are not limited to peacetime challenges to 
freedoms of navigation and overflight. In fact, the forces 
of China’s People’s Liberation Army have been developed 
over the past two decades specifically for the purpose 
of deterring and defending against American and allied 
interventions throughout the East Asian littoral in response 
to situations in which China seeks to enforce control by 
military aggression or other coercive means. The popular 
Pentagon phraseology of the moment to describe China’s 
strategy is that of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD).
It is worth noting also that important institutions such as 
the Law of the Sea Convention do not apply to certain 
waters only, but are global in scope. Any concerted 
attempt to undermine such international rules and norms 
in East Asia does not just have regional consequences: the 
impact would be to damage the global liberal order.
While imperfect, any breakdown of the 
UNCLOS or other institutions of global  
order could be catastrophic, resulting in  
a truly chaotic and conflict-ridden  
maritime environment.
 A strong nerve thus is required by all states heavily 
invested in maintaining a liberal international order to deter 
or prevent states such as China from further undermining 
that system, including at sea. It is for just such a purpose 
that states such as Australia and Japan have been 
deepening their strategic relationship in concert with their 
common ally, the United States. 
16 See, for example, Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “The Bull in the China Shop: 
Raising Tensions in the Asia-Pacific Region” and “Military Activities in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone: East Asia Focus,” both in International Law 
Studies, Vol. 90 (2014), pp. 66-100 and 514-543, respectively. 
17 See Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation in the Indo-Pacific Region, 
Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 22 (Canberra: Sea Power 
Centre – Australia, 2008).
18 Martin Tsamenyi and Barry Snushall, “The Legal Dimension of 
Maritime Military Operations,” in Positioning Navies for the Future, ed. 
Jack McCaffrie (Sydney: Halstead Press, 2006), p. 116.
19 For the Chinese position see China’s responses to other states’ 
submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: 
People’s Republic of China, Letter to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, Doc. CML/17/2009, 7 May 2009; and Letter to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Doc. CML/18/2009, 7 May 2009. See 
also Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, “The Nine-dash Line in the South 
China Sea: History, Status, and Implications,” The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 107, No. 1 (January 2013), pp. 98-124.
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China is not the sole challenger to international order, but  
in the Indo-Pacific it lies at the centre of great power 
strategic competition at sea, whether its competitor is 
Japan, the United States or India. Nonetheless, the Indo-
Pacific is replete with other maritime conflicts and disputes, 
and is home to many cases of enmity or historical mistrust 
not involving Beijing. None of these political-strategic 
factors necessarily preclude states from engaging in 
cooperation for maritime security, but they can seriously 
hamper those efforts.
Transnational maritime security challenges
Cooperation to deal with transnational maritime security 
challenges is clearly far easier to achieve in some cases 
than others. This may be due to the type of threat, the 
particular states involved, or the location of the problem. 
Cooperation on certain issues is relatively simple to deal 
with. For example, international cooperation in the search 
for the missing Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 in the 
southern Indian Ocean has been relatively easy, at least 
politically, if not necessarily operationally. Even if the cause 
of the crash is disputed, the international imperative to find 
the wreckage is not controversial, and no state’s maritime 
jurisdiction seems to be included in the search area. Even 
in the case of the crash of Indonesia AirAsia flight QZ8501/
AWQ8501 into the Java Sea in December 2014, multiple 
countries rendered assistance to Indonesia in the search 
and recovery operations. Thus, even in the archipelagic 
waters of a state highly conscious of its interests in 
protecting its sovereign integrity, it was not controversial 
to invite or allow foreign navies to assist Indonesian 
authorities. Search and rescue, and recovery operations 
are probably the least-sensitive issues to deal with when it 
comes to international collaboration.
To take another example, however – that of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea – demonstrates both possibilities 
and limitations for collaboration. It is important to 
remember that, while the two activities may be functionally 
equivalent, legally they are quite distinct. Piracy is an 
international crime with universal jurisdiction that occurs on 
the high seas.20 As a result of UNCLOS article 58(2), which 
applies certain high seas provisions to the EEZ, the law of 
piracy also applies within the exclusive economic zone. As 
we have witnessed in the extensive multinational efforts to 
suppress Somali piracy in the Indian Ocean, collaboration 
is not only possible, but has been successful, albeit at 
great financial cost to sustain the naval effort. 
However, armed robbery at sea, which is a common but 
non-legal term to describe piratical acts that occur in 
waters under the sovereignty of the coastal state, where 
the international law of piracy doesn’t apply, is altogether a 
more problematic issue for maritime security collaboration. 
In Southeast Asia, most, albeit not all, piratical incidents 
occur within zones of coastal state sovereignty: internal 
waters, archipelagic waters and territorial seas.21  
This means that the coastal state itself is responsible for 
enforcement actions to protect vessels in those zones 
from piratical attack, presuming it has the capacity and/
or the appropriate legislative framework in place to deal 
with the threat. Given that most of these incidents occur in 
the waters of states that jealously guard their sovereignty, 
there are obvious limits to cooperation. Indeed, few 
states anywhere are likely to be willing to invite foreign 
enforcement vessels into waters under their sovereignty to 
assist in such maritime security operations. 
The cause of collaboration is not altogether lost, however: 
there are many ways in which states can assist afflicted 
coastal states, including by sharing information,22 or by 
building coastal state capacity, from training personnel to 
supplying vessels or other equipment and infrastructure. 
The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) in Singapore 
is a leading regional example of international cooperation to 
improve the sharing of maritime security information.  
An even more difficult transnational problem is that of 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. This 
difficulty in part stems from the fact that fish are inherently 
transnational: they don’t respect international boundaries 
even if such borders have been agreed. Obviously, in 
areas where waters are in dispute or boundaries have 
yet to be delimited, enforcement actions are inherently 
compromised, and fish stocks suffer in the absence of 
sound governance. The problem also relates to the sad 
fact that demand far outweighs the available supply of 
marine-capture fish, and fishing capacity and fishing 
technology developments far outweigh the sustainability 
of fish stocks. Further, IUU fishing is compounded by the 
fact that the international legal framework to combat the 
problem is highly constrained,23 meaning that coastal 
states often are forced to deal with highly organised 
transnational criminal groups or toughminded fishermen 
from a starting point of relative legal disadvantage. 
20 UNCLOS arts. 101 and 105.
21 For details, including locations, on piratical incidents throughout 
Asia, see the regular reports prepared by the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre, available at http://www.
recaap.org/.
22 I have discussed the information sharing issue extensively in Chris 
Rahman, The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications for 
the Royal Australian Navy, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 24 
(Canberra: Sea Power Centre – Australia, 2008), pp. 35-49.
23 The standard text on IUU fishing is Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi 
and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries: The International 
Legal Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010); and see also Mary Ann Palma-
Robles, “Fisheries Enforcement and the Concepts of Compliance 
and Monitoring, Control and Surveillance,” in Routledge Handbook of 
Maritime Regulation and Enforcement, pp. 139-160.
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Operationally, combating IUU fishing can also be extremely 
difficult, especially across vast areas of ocean, such 
as in the Southwest Pacific, where small island states 
depend on assistance for aerial surveillance. Surveillance 
assistance is only one part of Australia’s Pacific Patrol Boat 
Program to help the Pacific island states with fisheries 
enforcement, a leading example of regional maritime 
security collaboration.
In narrow sea areas, however, the problems are often 
more of a political nature, and not just with respect to 
unresolved jurisdiction. It is the case in Southeast Asia, 
for instance, that many of the worst perpetrators of IUU 
fishing may be one’s near neighbours.24 This creates 
political, legal and operational headaches for states trying 
to enforce their waters and protect the sustainability of 
fish stocks. The problem is worsened when waters are 
disputed. For example, Indonesia’s claimed South China 
Sea EEZ overlaps with China’s nine-dash line. There have 
been at least four separate incidents in this area, in which 
Indonesian fisheries patrol boats have arrested Chinese 
fishing boats, only to be forced by much larger Chinese 
civilian enforcement vessels to release the alleged Chinese 
IUU boats. The most recent of these incidents occurred in 
the same area on 19 March 2016.25 
The future of regional collaboration
This conclusion does not set out to establish all the 
possible avenues for future maritime security collaboration 
in the Indo-Pacific region. Anyone who has been involved 
with the field for a number of years will understand that 
maritime security cooperation, despite its limits, has grown 
substantially over the past 20 years. Many significant 
achievements have been hard won, such as Japan’s 
important ReCAAP initiative, the only official regional 
organisation for dealing with maritime security issues. 
Even if its remit is limited to information-sharing only 
about certain classes of threats, the establishment of the 
Information Sharing Centre has been a major step forward 
for cooperation to combat piracy and armed robbery at 
sea. That it includes China, which, as pointed out above, 
is a leading source of instability at sea, and an opponent of 
Japanese maritime security initiatives, is a telling indication 
that there are some issues of common interest that may 
transcend even underlying strategic tensions. Japan, 
Australia, the United States, Singapore and India are all 
leading efforts to boost collaboration for maritime security 
in the Indo-Pacific. Further and deeper cooperation will no 
doubt evolve, as it must.
However, future cooperation can only occur within strict 
constraints, some of which have been outlined in this 
essay. Many of those structural limitations will mean that 
cooperation can only occur in certain circumstances or 
over certain issues. 
The route to better-governed seas, especially 
in East Asia, but more broadly throughout the 
Indo-Pacific, will be a choppy one. 
And, if China, in particular, continues on its path of 
challenging the regional order, collaboration to combat 
transnational security problems at sea will become even 
more difficult. Stronger defence alliances and coalitions to 
protect the existing liberal order will likely be a necessary 
step, then, in order to address transnational maritime 
security issues. 
Alliance-strengthening efforts such as those being pursued 
by the United States with Japan, Australia and the 
Philippines, and U.S. coalition-building activities, such as 
the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), are at 
the very least implicitly aimed at countering the instability 
at sea being generated by Chinese activities. In the case 
of the Maritime Security Initiative, first announced by U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter at the May 2015  
Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Washington will 
commit US$425 million over five years to maritime security 
capacity-building for South China Sea littoral states, 
focused on surveillance and maritime situational awareness 
capabilities. The initial funding priority for the United States 
is the Philippines, but Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Vietnam also are expected to benefit from MSI projects.26 
Similarly, Indian maritime security capacity-building in 
Indian Ocean island states has the dual role of improving 
national and regional maritime security and countering 
Chinese political influence.
Efforts of these sorts to counter Chinese influence, while at 
the same time building regional and sub-regional maritime 
security capacity, are not contradictory in purpose, but they 
do complicate attempts at wider, inclusive, non-coalition 
maritime cooperation to combat transnational threats at 
sea.27 Encouraging Chinese participation, and that of other 
sceptical or cautious states, can be all the more difficult 
due to the underlying strategic contexts for coalition-
building behaviour. Nonetheless, the ReCAAP example is 
proof that inclusiveness under particular circumstances, at 
least involving China, is still possible.
24 See, for example, the interview with Indonesia’s forthright Minister 
of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, “RI, Others Stand Up 
to Bullying by Big Countries: Minister Susi,” The Jakarta Post (15 April 
2016), p. 3.
25 Tama Salim, “RI-China Sea Spat Continues,” The Jakarta Post (22 
March 2016), p. 1.
26 Megan Eckstein, “The Philippines at Forefront of New Pentagon 
Maritime Security Initiative,” U.S. Naval Institute news (18 April 2016), 
available at https://news.usni.org/2016/04/18/the-philippines-at-
forefront-of-new-pentagon-maritime-security-initiative.
27 I have developed a framework for naval and maritime cooperation 
based on alliance, coalition and non-coalition levels of cooperation in 
Chris Rahman, Naval Cooperation and Coalition Building in Southeast 
Asia and the Southwest Pacific: Status and Prospect, Sea Power 
Centre and Centre for Maritime Policy Working Paper No. 7 (Canberra: 
Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, October 2001).
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These points lead to a conclusion that Indo-Pacific 
maritime security cooperation needs to continue to be 
pursued on multiple paths. The proliferation of forums 
and various institutional arrangements for collaboration 
may sometimes be thought of as introducing unnecessary 
redundancy and repetition into the regional maritime 
security cooperation equation. Yet it is possible that a 
multiplicity of options for cooperation can be beneficial 
in circumstances in which certain states may be wary of 
some avenues for collaboration but not others. It may well 
be the case that Track II unofficial fora have little to offer 
now that so much official-level activity takes place. But 
redundancy of effort at the official level, across alliance, 
coalition and non-coalition levels of cooperation, and 
between military and civilian sectors, offers the best 
opportunities over the long run to both strengthen regional 
deterrence against adventurism at sea, and deepen 
networks of more politically neutral collaboration to deal 
with transnational maritime security problems.
